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Abstract 
This paper provides a critical examination about the effect of externally-imposed French Revolution institutions on regional 
economic development variations in the 19th century by focusing on the experience of France where the Revolution originated. 
Acemoglu et al. (2011) take advantage of the “natural experiment” provided by the imposition of French institutions on a number 
of German states by the invading Napoleonic armies. The argument that the differences in the long-run economic performance of 
German states stem from the differences in externally-imposed French and domestic German institutions needs to be investigated 
further. In order to achieve this purpose, first the variation in historical urbanization rates across the French departments is 
examined statistically. Then a difference-in-difference estimation is used to identify a treatment effect causing growth differences 
between border and interior departments. The proposed treatment effect is the faster industrialization due to intensified minerals 
mining and railway construction in north and northeast France after 1850. It is shown that the border departments experienced 
higher economic growth primarily after 1850 even though the Revolution institutions and reforms were imposed uniformly across 
the French departments. Therefore, all the variation in economic development across German polities cannot be attributed to the 
externally-imposed French institutions and reforms.  
Keywords: French Revolution, Externally-Imposed Institutions, Regional Growth Differences, Urbanization, French 
Departments. 
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1. Introduction  
The effect of institutions on economic performance has remained a long-debated and 
unresolved issue in the literature. The examples of institutional reform failures in Africa, Latin 
America, the former Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, and the recent cases of Afghanistan 
and Iraq support the view that radical changes in institutions do not necessarily have a positive 
effect on economic outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2011). According to Hayek (1960), institutions 
cannot be designed, and have to emerge and form under natural and local conditions. A related 
view states that the externally-imposed institutions and reforms should be in harmony with the 
set of circumstances in the host countries (Berkowitz et al., 2003a, b, Rodrik, 2007). 
Nevertheless, there are successful external institutional reform cases such as the post Second 
World War institutional transformations in Germany and Japan designed by the US.  
The related debate about the economic outcomes of the French Revolution has also not 
reached an agreement. On the one hand, some economic historians identify the French 
Revolution and following wars as an obstacle slowing down technology adoption and the 
industrial revolution in continental Europe (Landes, 1969 and Crouzet, 2001). For instance, 
Buyst and Mokyr (1990) argue that the Napoleonic wars hampered economic development in the 
Netherlands. On the other hand, the view that the enactment of the civil code, abolition of guilds 
and serfdom, and agricultural reforms caused by the French Revolution led the way to the 
industrial revolution and institutional enlightenment in continental Europe suggests that the 
French Revolution fostered economic development in the parts of Europe affected by the 
Revolution and subsequent invasion (Olson, 1982 and Acemoglu, 2008).      
The French Revolution reforms and institutions can be gathered under three categories: 
Legal, commerce and agricultural reforms. The enactment of commercial courts and civil code 
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introduced the notion of everyone’s equality before the law. The abolishment of the seigneurial 
regime and guilds contributed to the emergence of a more free labor market. These institutions 
and reforms helped to build a solid basis for an economic environment friendly to the newly 
emerging commercial and industrial businesses. In the agricultural area, serfdom was officially 
banned. Moreover, political control and feudal landholding privileges of the elite and the Church 
were abolished. 
In this paper, I develop a counter-argument to the argument developed in Acemoglu, 
Cantoni, Johnson, and Robinson (2011) by comparing differences in the long-run economic 
performance of French regions. Acemoglu et al. (2011) recently attempted to explore the effect 
of the French Revolution on German institutions and long-run German economic growth. To do 
this they compare the differences in the economic performance of those German states that were 
invaded by Napoleonic armies and adopted French institutions with other German states that 
retained the particularly German legal and economic institutions throughout. Their empirical 
analysis results indicate that there remained a sustained difference in economic performance long 
after the invaders retreated, and they argue that these regional economic development differences 
were caused by the externally imposed French Revolution reforms and institutions.  
Acemoglu et al. (2011) use the evidence of within Germany regional growth differences 
to test the hypothesis that radical and externally-imposed reforms of the French Revolution 
caused higher and more rapid economic growth in the German polities where they were imposed. 
Acemoglu et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between the length of French Revolutionary 
armies’ occupation (treatment variable) and economic prosperity in both a reduced-form analysis 
and a two-stage least squares framework. They find out that in the invaded German states where 
French Revolution institutional reforms were enforced, a faster urbanization took place primarily 
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after 1850. Nonetheless, the authors point out certain caveats about their findings such that they 
acknowledge that a higher economic growth was observed in German polities where French 
Revolution institutions were imposed mainly after 1850. They also recognize that their findings 
are valid for a limited period for which historical data are available. 
Since the Revolution reforms and institutions were uniformly enforced across all regions 
in France, if, as hypothesized, it is found that there were significant regional growth differences 
in France, it would count as evidence against the hypothesis that all the variation in the regional 
economic development between invaded and non-invaded German polities were caused by the 
French institutions.  
In order to examine this issue for France, department level historical urbanization rates 
between years 1800 and 1901 are used as a proxy for regional economic development. First, 
taking advantage of a statistical test I show that significantly different urbanization rates were 
observed in the French departments. This finding suggests that the departments went through 
different economic development experiences after the French Revolution embarked. Second, I 
use a difference-in-difference estimation to show that there was a treatment effect which was 
different than the Revolution institutions and reforms causing the regional growth variations in 
France. The proposed treatment effect is that after 1850 coal, steel and iron ore mining, and 
railway construction in the northeast and east border departments caused a faster economic 
growth compared to other regions in France. The treatment effect is found to be statistically 
significant. Third, I examine the effects of industrialization, education and health services on the 
departments’ urbanization rates. The results of this three-level analysis indicate that all the 
variation in economic growth between the French-invaded German polities and non-invaded 
5 
 
German polities cannot be attributed to the externally-imposed French Revolution reforms and 
institutions.                 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the 
economic conditions in France before the Revolution. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis, 
and section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Economic and Social Environment in France before and during the Revolution 
The French Revolution took place under negative economic conditions. The monarchical 
authority was in bankruptcy. Agricultural production in northern France was damaged by poor 
weather conditions, causing the price of bread, the main staple food for most of the population, 
to rise. Since consumers spent the majority of their earnings on food the demand for other goods 
decreased (Doyle, 2001). Moreover, the manufacturing sector was negatively affected by British 
competition and by the ensuing lower prices under the commercial treaty of 1786. In addition to 
this, the unemployment rate was increasing, and an unexpectedly cold winter hampered 
production done by mills and bulk transport. 
Before the French Revolution social life and the economy were controlled by a few 
dominant groups. The landlords were imposing a light version of serfdom by putting peasants 
under the burden of heavy taxes and tributes, limiting the mobility of peasants, and hindering the 
emergence of a free labor market. The urban oligarchy dominant in trade and production sectors 
strictly controlled important occupations for their own economic benefit by restricting the new 
entries into professions and the use of new technology (Doyle, 2001). In rural areas, the nobility 
and Church clergy had the privilege of not paying taxes, and they were not subject to the same 
laws and courts as peasants, which created an inequitable political and economic atmosphere. 
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This long term and widespread economic crisis, and social inequality led to a meeting of 
the Estates-General in 1789 for the first time in 175 years. The Estates-General took the name 
National Constituent Assembly with the promise of gathering more political power in itself and 
writing a constitution. It abolished feudalism, the nobility’s special privileges and rights, and the 
Church clergy’s authority of taxation. The constitution that was finalized on September 29, 1791 
declared France as a constitutional monarchy. The abolition of guilds followed this. In 1804 
Napoleon declared himself as emperor, and between 1799 and 1815 he pursued a widespread 
invasion in continental Europe. Hence, it can be said that the French Revolution was triggered by 
social injustice and economic crisis, and it caused removal of the institutions of the ancien 
regime, and had profound political and economic consequences within France and in Europe.   
 
3. Data Collection and Empirical Analysis  
3.1. Data Details  
The data on historical output/income per capita are usually not available, so to measure 
economic development in the past centuries historical city size and urbanization are often used as 
proxies (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002, and Tabellini, 2010). The motivation behind 
this assumption is that in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries in Europe, cities were the trade centers, and 
most of the economic activities were happening in the center or in the proximity of these urban 
regions. In addition to this, significant industrialization movements in Europe mostly started in 
the cities. Hence, historical city size and urbanization rate data can give us information about 
how developed a region was, and so these variables can be used to represent economic prosperity 
in a region.            
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The administrative area of France is divided into 95 departments. Urbanization rate at the 
department level is used as proxy for economic development. In the literature urbanization rate is 
commonly defined as the fraction of population living in cities with more than 5000 inhabitants 
(Chandler, 1987, and Bairoch, Batou and Chevre, 1988). Historical city size and department size 
data are collected from Chandler (1987) and Lahmeyer (n.d.). Since the historical department 
population statistics compiled by Lahmeyer (n.d.) start only in 1800, this year also marks the 
earliest year for the urbanization rates in the sample. 
During the 19
th
 century the number of departments was changing through treaties and 
wars with neighbor countries. Nevertheless, in our sample the number of departments is set at 95, 
so in a specific sample year if the region in question was not defined as a French department, 
then there are no relevant data for that department in that year, and it would be recorded as a 
missing observation. It would make the analysis unnecessarily complicated if we changed the 
number of departments for any sample year according to the border changes due to treaties and 
wars with neighbor countries.  
In both Chandler (1987) and Lahmeyer (n.d.) the available city and department size 
statistics are clustered in the years 1810 and 1901 (there are still substantial missing data in 
1800). An interpolation technique is used to fill in the missing observations on the assumption 
that the city and department populations followed relatively smooth and predictable trends 
between 1810 and 1901 (Vollrath, 2007). Hence, the missing observation in year 𝑎 which is 
between the actual observations in years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 𝑛 is calculated as  
𝑥𝑎 = 𝑥𝑡 + (𝑎 − 𝑡)(𝑥𝑡+𝑛 − 𝑥𝑡)/𝑛                                                                                                  (1)     
where years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 𝑛 correspond to 1810 and 1901 respectively. In this way, by using 
the available city size and department size data, and the simple linear interpolation technique 
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urbanization rates at the department level are computed for the years 1800, 1810, 1820, 1831, 
1851, 1861, 1876, and 1901 based on the population statistics of 697 cities.   
The French departments are divided into 24 border and 71 interior departments. Paris and 
its surrounding area, northeast, and east regions close to Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Germany, and Switzerland are classified as border departments. This classification of the 
departments is motivated by the finding and argument in the economic history literature that the 
industrial revolution in continental Europe initially started as a regional development based on 
availability of the mining of coal, iron ore, and steel which served as inputs in the fledgling 
industrial sector, and also based on railway construction (Barnes et al., 1966, Cameron and Neal, 
2003, Clapham, 1936, and Pollard, 1981). The regions where these inputs were readily available 
formed a corridor that ran from parts of Belgium through northeastern France down to the border 
of France with Switzerland. Much of Germany occupied by Napoleonic armies also happens to 
be part of this natural resource-rich region in northern and northeastern Europe. This suggests 
another probable mechanism for the differential growth within France and Germany independent 
of the institutional framework imposed.  
3.2. Statistical Inference  
A statistical t-test is performed for the years that the majority of the original data (not 
interpolated) are available, 1800, 1810 and 1901 to examine whether the interior departments 
and border departments had different urbanization rates on average, and so experienced different 
economic growth performances. The null hypothesis here is that there was no difference in the 
mean urbanization rates between the border departments and interior departments, and the 
alternative hypothesis is that on average the border departments experienced a higher 
urbanization compared to the interior departments.  
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Tables 2-4 in the Appendix show descriptive statistics of urbanization grouped by the 
border and interior departments in the three years. We did not find supporting evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis only for the year 1801. The test results for the years 1810 and 1901 show 
that we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. In Table 3, in 1810 the mean urbanization 
rate in border departments was 16%, and it was 10.5% in interior departments. Table 4 shows 
that in 1901, the mean urbanization rate was 34.1% in border departments, and 20.3% in interior 
departments, so we can see that the urbanization gap between border departments and interior 
departments increased in 90 years. Hence there is statistical evidence supporting the argument 
that border departments had higher urbanization rates compared to interior departments 
suggesting that French departments went through different economic development periods both 
in the short run and long run after the French Revolution. This indicates that within France 
significant regional economic growth differences occurred after the Revolution and enforcement 
of institutional reforms.     
3.3. Difference-in-Difference Estimation  
In their paper Acemoglu et al. (2011) argue that some German polities grew faster than 
others because these polities were subjected to the treatment of French Revolution reforms and 
institutions through French invasion while others did not. One way to test this argument is to 
carry out a difference-in-difference regression for the French case, as it is already shown in the 
previous section that there were differences in regional growth within France. Since the French 
Revolution institutions and reforms were uniformly imposed in the French departments the 
regional economic growth differences between the interior and border departments should be 
caused by a different treatment effect.  
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In the continental Europe the industrial revolution took a faster pace with increasing coal, 
iron ore and steel mining, and railway construction primarily after 1850 (Clapham, 1936, and 
Pollard, 1981). In France natural resource mining, railway construction, and industrialization 
process were more intense in the northeast and east border regions. Therefore the proposed 
treatment effect here is that the speedy industrialization in the border departments which was 
supportively reinforced by natural resources mining and railway construction intensified after 
1850. In order to show the impact of this treatment effect on urbanization we use a difference-in-
difference econometric model similar to the one used in Card and Krueger (1994). In this model, 
the period of interest is the years, time period, after 1850, and the treatment group is the border 
departments. Therefore, the urbanization rates for the eight years mentioned above are divided 
into two broad groups; before 1850 and after 1850. For each group an average urbanization rate 
is calculated. The difference-in-difference regression equation we use is as the following;  
𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (2)              
where the dependent variable is the average urbanization rate. The variable 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 takes 
the value 1 if it is a border department, and the variable 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 takes the value 1 if the period is 
after 1850. The interaction term (𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡) demonstrates the treatment effect 
which is the faster, more intense industrialization carried through coal-iron ore-steel mining and 
railway construction in the border departments after 1850. Hence 𝛽3 is the coefficient of interest 
here. Table 5 depicts the regression results. At the 10% significance level 𝛽3 is found to be 
statistically significant with a positive sign. The regression results suggest that there is evidence 
in support for the treatment effect of the more speedy and intense industrialization in the border 
departments after 1850.  
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The difference-in-difference model examines whether there was a treatment factor 
affecting primarily the border departments after 1850. The proposed treatment effect is the 
location of natural resources and railways necessary to transport the natural resources to 
production points. France did not search and work of most of its coal resources that were 
gathered mainly at the Luxembourg border in east France, and in northeast France lining into the 
corridor of Belgium and Germany until after 1850 (Clapham, 1936, and Pollard, 1981). 
Furthermore, France was also suffering from insufficient railway network for a long time 
hampering coal and iron ore transportation. Railway construction gained momentum after 1850, 
and the coal and other natural resources clustered regions were given priority to be the first 
routes for the new rail network (Cameron, 1970). Therefore, the industrial revolution in France 
initially started in the east and northeast border regions where coal and iron ore were extracted 
and transported with the railway after 1850.             
 This finding counts as a counter-argument against the argument in Acemoglu et al. 
(2011) that it was the French Revolution institutions and reforms that caused higher economic 
growth in the German polities invaded by French armies compared to other polities which were 
not invaded. One possible explanation for the differences in regional growth observed both in 
Germany and France could be the mining of coal and other minerals, and its positive impact on 
subsequent industrialization in continental Europe (Barnes et al., 1966).  
3.4. OLS Regression  
An OLS regression is used as an exercise to examine some of the other factors which 
could affect economic development. The log value of the industrial production in the year 1861 
is used as a variable indicating industrialization. The total number of medical students and law 
students in 1866, weighted by the departments’ populations is used as an education variable. The 
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tertiary education data are not available for the year 1861, and 1866 is the closest year with the 
available data. As an indication of the level and availability of health services, the total numbers 
of doctors and health officers in 1847 and 1866, weighted by the departments’ populations and 
interpolated to the year 1861 is also used as an independent variable in the regression
2
. These 
data are collected from La Statistique Generale de la France to examine the effects of 
industrialization, health services and education on economic development around 1861.  
The complete sample is divided into the border departments and interior departments 
subsamples. The general regression equation can be written as the following:  
𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ + 𝜀𝑖     (3) 
where the dependent variable is the urbanization rate in 1861 in either border departments or 
interior departments. The regression results can be seen in Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix. Due 
to the limited available data this econometric analysis is done for a single year. For the interior 
departments, industrial production and the availability of health services show statistically 
significant positive effects on economic development proxied by urbanization rate. Regarding 
the border departments it is found that the coefficient of health services appears to be 
insignificant. Industrial production and tertiary education exert statistically significant and 
positive effects on economic development.  
4. Conclusion  
The French Revolution resulted in a large-scale and long-term institutional 
transformation in Europe. It permanently changed the social and political setting in France, and 
then in continental Europe through invasions of French Revolutionary armies and Napoleon. 
                                                          
2
 To obtain the statistics for 1861, the same interpolation technique which is used to calculate the missing 
urbanization rates before is also adopted here. 
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Whether externally-imposed French Revolution reforms and institutions positively affected 
economic development in Europe is a long-debated topic. In one of the recent studies, Acemoglu 
et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence that externally-imposed, radical French Revolution 
institutions caused a faster long-run economic growth in the invaded German polities compared 
to non-invaded polities in the second half of the 19
th
 century. This paper focuses on the case of 
France, examines regional economic prosperity variations within France during the 19
th
 century, 
and proposes a counter-argument saying that the regional differences in institutions have not 
been the only or leading reason in causing regional economic growth differences.  
Urbanization rates at the department level are used as proxy for economic development 
for the years 1800, 1810, 1820, 1831, 1851, 1861, 1876, and 1901. The 95 departments are 
divided into two subgroups as the interior and border departments. By using statistical analysis, 
we comfortably reject the null hypothesis that average urbanization rates of the interior and 
border departments were equal in the years 1810 and 1901, indicating that regional economic 
growth differences were experienced within France. This result suggests that even though French 
Revolution institutions and reforms were imposed uniformly in France, they might not 
necessarily cause the departments to experience similar economic growth trends both in the 
short-run and long-run after the onset of French Revolution.  
A difference-in-difference estimation is used to examine the effect of a treatment causing 
regional growth differences in France. The proposed treatment is that a more rapid 
industrialization caused by the coal-iron ore-steel mining and railway construction took place in 
the northeast and east France contributing to higher economic development observed in the 
border departments after 1850. The coal mining, railway construction, and proto-industrialization 
also played an important role in those German polities which were invaded by the French 
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Revolutionary and then Napoleonic armies, and where French Revolution institutional reforms 
were implemented (Barnes et al, 1966, Pollard, 1981, and Cameron and Neal, 2003). In their 
analysis Acemoglu et al. (2011) find a faster economic development occurring in the invaded 
German polities primarily after 1850 as the main result.  
Moreover, we exercise an OLS regression to examine the impacts of industrialization, 
tertiary education, and availability of health services on economic development proxied by 
urbanization in the year 1861. It is found that these factors have positive effects on economic 
development. In this paper, by using the evidence of regional economic growth differences in 
France where the Revolution reforms and institutions originated, and by investigating the causes 
of differences in development in the host country of the Revolution we develop an argument that 
externally imposed institutions may not be the primary reason causing all the variation in 
regional economic prosperity. Furthermore, the treatment effect of coal-iron ore-steel mining and 
railway construction that happened after 1850, and improvements in industrialization, education 
and health services are found to have positive effects on urbanization within France in the 
medium run after the onset of the Revolution. The limited availability of reliable regional 
historical data has brought about empirical analysis challenges in this paper
3
. Future research 
about the industrial revolution in continental Europe appears promising if more detailed, micro-
level historical data related to coal mining, railway construction, and infant industrialization are 
made available.                
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Detailed historical European statistics at the country level can be found in Mitchell (1981). 
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 Appendix  
Table 1: French Departments     
Department Dept.no Capital Region 
Ain 1 Bourg-en-Bresse border 
Aisne 2 Laon border 
Allier 3 Moulins interior 
Alpes-de-Haute-Provence 4 Digne interior 
Alpes (Hautes-) 5 Gap interior 
Alpes-Maritimes 6 Nice interior 
Ardèche 7 Privas interior 
Ardennes 8 Charleville-Mézières border 
Ariège 9 Foix interior 
Aube 10 Troyes interior 
Aude 11 Carcassonne interior 
Aveyron 12 Rodez interior 
Bouches-du-Rhône 13 Marseille interior 
Calvados 14 Caen interior 
Cantal 15 Aurillac interior 
Charente 16 Angoulême interior 
Charente-Maritime 17 La Rochelle interior 
Cher 18 Bourges interior 
Corrèze 19 Tulle interior 
Corse 20 Ajaccio interior 
Côte-d'Or 21 Dijon interior 
Côtes-d'Armor 22 Saint-Brieuc interior 
Creuse 23 Guéret interior 
Dordogne 24 Périgueux interior 
Doubs 25 Besançon border 
Drôme 26 Valence interior 
Eure 27 Évreux interior 
Eure-et-Loir 28 Chartres interior 
Finistère 29 Quimper interior 
Gard 30 Nîmes interior 
Garonne (Haute-) 31 Toulouse interior 
Gers 32 Auch interior 
Gironde 33 Bordeaux interior 
Hérault 34 Montpellier interior 
Ille-et-Vilaine 35 Rennes interior 
Indre 36 Châteauroux interior 
Indre-et-Loire 37 Tours interior 
Isère 38 Grenoble interior 
16 
 
Jura 39 Lons-le-Saunier border 
Landes 40 Mont-de-Marsan interior 
Loir-et-Cher 41 Blois interior 
Loire 42 Saint-Étienne interior 
Loire (Haute-) 43 Le Puy interior 
Loire-Atlantique 44 Nantes interior 
Loiret 45 Orléans interior 
Lot 46 Cahors interior 
Lot-et-Garonne 47 Agen interior 
Lozère 48 Mende interior 
Maine-et-Loire 49 Angers interior 
Manche 50 Saint-Lô interior 
Marne 51 Châlons-sur-Marne border 
Marne (Haute-) 52 Chaumont interior 
Mayenne 53 Laval interior 
Meurthe-et-Moselle 54 Nancy border 
Meuse 55 Bar-le-Duc border 
Morbihan 56 Vannes interior 
Moselle 57 Metz border 
Nièvre 58 Nevers interior 
Nord 59 Lille border 
Oise 60 Beauvais border 
Orne 61 Alençon interior 
Pas-de-Calais 62 Arras border 
Puy-de-Dôme 63 Clermont-Ferrand interior 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques 64 Pau interior 
Pyrénées (Hautes-) 65 Tarbes interior 
Pyrénées-Orientales 66 Perpignan interior 
Rhin (Bas-) 67 Strasbourg border 
Rhin (Haut-) 68 Colmar border 
Rhône 69 Lyon interior 
Saône (Haute-) 70 Vesoul interior 
Saône-et-Loire 71 Mâcon interior 
Sarthe 72 Le Mans interior 
Savoie 73 Chambéry interior 
Savoie (Haute-) 74 Annecy border 
Paris 75 Paris border 
Seine-Maritime 76 Rouen interior 
Seine-et-Marne 77 Melun border 
Yvelines 78 Versailles interior 
Sévres (Deux-) 79 Niort interior 
Somme 80 Amiens border 
Tarn 81 Albi interior 
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Table 2: Urbanization in 1800         
       Department Obs. Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation 95%Conf. Interval 
Border 10 0.169 0.084 0.265 -0.021 0.36 
Interior 28 0.117 0.02 0.105 0.076 0.158 
Combined 38 0.131 0.026 0.16 0.078 0.183 
Difference    0.059  -0.068 0.172 
Note: Descriptive statistics for urbanization in 1800 at the department level.  
𝑡 = 0.8766; Pr(𝑇 > 𝑡) = 0.1933, 𝑎𝑡 𝑝 < 0.05                                                                      (4) 
 
Table 3: Urbanization in 1810         
       Department Obs. Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation 95%Conf. Interval 
Border 17 0.16 0.054 0.223 0.045 0.275 
Interior 67 0.105 0.0104 0.085 0.084 0.126 
Combined 84 0.116 0.0138 0.126 0.089 0.144 
Difference    0.034  -0.0125 0.122 
Note: Descriptive statistics for urbanization in 1810 at the department level. 
𝑡 = 1.62; Pr(𝑇 > 𝑡) = 0.0545, 𝑎𝑡 𝑝 < 0.05                                                                          (5) 
 
 
Tarn-et-Garonne 82 Montauban interior 
Var 83 Toulon interior 
Vaucluse 84 Avignon interior 
Vendée 85 La Roche-sur-Yon interior 
Vienne 86 Poitiers interior 
Vienne (Haute-) 87 Limoges interior 
Vosges 88 Épinal border 
Yonne 89 Auxerre interior 
Belfort (Territoire de) 90 Belfort border 
Essonne 91 Évry interior 
Hauts-de-Seine 92 Nanterre border 
Seine-Saint-Denis 93 Bobigny border 
Val-de-Marne 94 Créteil border 
Val-d'Oise 95 Pontoise border 
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Table 4: Urbanization in 1901         
       Department Obs. Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation 95% Conf. Interval 
Border 24 0.341 0.054 0.265 0.229 0.453 
Interior 71 0.203 0.0167 0.141 0.17 0.237 
Combined 95 0.238 0.0193 0.189 0.2 0.276 
Difference   0.137 0.042  0.053 0.222 
Note: Descriptive statistics for urbanization in 1901 at the department level. 
𝑡 = 3.2388; Pr(𝑇 > 𝑡) = 0.0008, 𝑎𝑡 𝑝 < 0.05                                                                           (6) 
 
 
 
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
 (1) 
 urbanization 
department 0.0600 
 (0.0452) 
  
time 0.0583** 
 (0.0289) 
  
department*time 0.114* 
 (0.0606) 
  
constant 0.106** 
 (0.0206) 
Observations 182 
R
2
 0.156 
Note: Urbanization is the dependent variable. Standard  
         errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%;  
        ** significant at 5%. 
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Table 6: OLS Regression – Interior Departments 
 (1) 
 urbanization 1861 
log industrial production 0.0694** 
 (0.0126) 
  
education -2.358 
 (7.539) 
  
health 203.9** 
 (60.66) 
  
constant -0.845** 
 (0.169) 
Observations 69 
R
2
 0.377 
Note: Urbanization in 1861 is the dependent variable.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%.   
           
 
 
 
Table 7: OLS Regression – Border Departments 
 (1) 
 urbanization 1861 
log industrial production 0.0544** 
 (0.0203) 
  
education 604.9* 
 (306.5) 
  
health -153.9 
 (228.8) 
  
constant -0.661** 
 (0.271) 
Observations 18 
R
2
 0.544 
Note: Urbanization in 1861 is the dependent variable.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%. 
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